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INDUBITABLY UNCERTAIN: PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS 
AND THE ROLE OF VALUATION UNCERTAINTY IN 
ATTEMPTED CRAMDOWN OF ALL-EQUITY PLANS 
Anthony Sexton∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to confirm a plan over 
the objection of impaired creditors. This power, commonly known as 
“cramdown,” is constrained by the Fair and Equitable Rule. After enactment 
of the current Bankruptcy Code, one part of that rule has been a general 
prohibition against cramming down all-equity plans on prepetition secured 
creditors. But recent case law—specifically Philadelphia Newspapers—
provides an opening to debtors who wish to strip away a secured creditor’s 
lien. This Article demonstrates that such all-equity plans should not be 
confirmed because valuation uncertainty exposes junior and senior creditors 
alike to unjustifiable risks that are not present in lien retention plans. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Secured creditors are often thought to hold a privileged position in chapter 
11 bankruptcies.1 In such cases, debtors must provide adequate protection to 
safeguard against the diminution of a secured creditor’s collateral—and the 
terms secured creditors exact are often onerous.2 Additionally, prepetition 
secured creditors are commonly the postpetition debtor in possession (“DIP”) 
lenders, and they are able to exact significant concessions in that position. As a 
practical matter, then, secured creditors are often in the driver’s seat of chapter 
11 bankruptcies.3 This privileged position is arguably justifiable:4 the secured 
creditor has bargained for first priority on its collateral, and has paid a price (in 
the form of modest return and lack of upside potential) in exchange for its 
relative certainty regarding repayment.5 
Even in the rare case in which a secured creditor is not controlling the 
outcome, it has significant power in the plan confirmation process. The 
cramdown provisions applicable to a secured creditor require that, at a 
minimum, the creditor either (i) retain the lien on its collateral and receive 
deferred cash payments in the amount of its claim (“Retention Prong”); (ii) 
retain the lien on the proceeds of a sale of its collateral, subject to its right to 
credit bid (“Sale Prong”); or (iii) receive the “indubitable equivalent” of its 
secured claim (“Indubitable Equivalent Prong”).6 In addition to these 
“mechanical requirements,” the fair and equitable rule—a background 
principle of the plan confirmation process—may impose some “uncodified” 
 
 1 See, e.g., Heather Lennox, Michelle M. Harner & Eric R. Goodman, Reinstatement v. Cramdown: Do 
Secured Creditors Win or Lose?, 16 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 459, 461 (2007). 
 2 See, e.g., id.; see also Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
69, 80–82 (2004). 
 3 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 784–85 
(2002) (noting that prepetition secured lenders typically “control the firm inside of [c]hapter 11 as well as 
out”). 
 4 Supporters of alternative priority systems oppose the extent of the privilege accorded to secured 
creditors. See Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 
U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). The alternative systems are generally focused on the fact that the current 
priority system destroys the option value of junior creditors. Id. That discussion is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 5 Although an affected creditor would probably be able to sell her claim, it may be the case that imposed 
risk-averseness will depress the value of risky claims, as secured creditors feel regulatory pressure to unload 
bad debts. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 659 
(2010) (detailing the rise of claims trading in bankruptcy); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of 
Systematic Risk Regulation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 999 (2010) (noting that the Dodd-Frank Act imposes 
“risk-based capital requirements and leverage limits”). 
 6 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006). 
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additional restrictions; but, in practice, the explicit statutory requirements 
govern.7 
This Article explores whether a plan in which a secured creditor will be 
paid solely with equity8 should be confirmable under the Indubitable 
Equivalent Prong, even though such a plan could not be confirmed under either 
the Retention Prong or Sale Prong. The Indubitable Equivalent Prong has been 
prominently featured in recent academic literature9 due to the holding in In re 
Philadelphia Newspapers that a secured creditor need not retain precisely the 
same rights in a sale plan proposed under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong as 
it would retain under a § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) sale plan.10 The same reasoning 
could be applied to allow for cramdowns of all-equity plans.11 As this Article 
explains, valuation uncertainty poses significant risks in all-equity plans that 
are not present in lien retention plans, and these risks have significant ex ante 
and ex post affects. Accordingly, the Indubitable Equivalent Prong should not 
be read to allow for the cramdown of such plans. 
Section I reviews the ruling in Philadelphia Newspapers and explains how 
the court’s reading of the Indubitable Equivalent Prong can be expanded to 
allow for an all-equity plan. Section II explains the risks that all-equity plans 
pose due to valuation uncertainty. Sections III and IV examine past practice 
under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong (the “Step-Up doctrine” and the “New 
Value Exception”) to demonstrate that valuation uncertainty has driven past 
 
 7 See generally Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229 (1990). This Article addresses 
the possible implication of one such “uncodified” requirement—the “Step-Up doctrine.” See discussion infra 
Section IV. 
 8 Referred to as an “all-equity” or “lien-stripping” plan throughout this Article. 
 9 See generally Vincent Buccola & Ashley Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of Bankruptcy 
Auctions, 18 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 99 (2010); Hollace T. Cohen, Is the Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC 
Decision the Death Knell to Credit Bidding in a Sale Under a Plan?, 20 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 
(2011); Gregory F. Pesce, The Irrelevance of Philadelphia Newspapers, BANKR. LITIG. COMM. NEWSL. (Am. 
Bankr. Inst., Alexandria, Va.), May, 2011, http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/litigation/ 
vol8num3/philly.html. 
 10 In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 11 It is true that Philadelphia Newspapers has been widely criticized. Indeed, after the main body of this 
Article’s work was completed, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow Philadelphia Newspapers. See River Rd. 
Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC), 651 F.3d 642, 653 (7th Cir. 
2011) (declining to follow Philadelphia Newspapers), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3112 (U.S. Aug. 5, 
2011) (No. 11-166). However, Philadelphia Newspapers is the law for chapter 11 cases filed in Delaware. 
Cohen, supra note 9, at 4 (discussing the potential effect of Philadelphia Newspapers in Delaware). To the 
extent the Philadelphia Newspapers reasoning grants debtors greater leeway in the cramdown process, the 
result will be an even more disproportionate number of chapter 11 petitions being filed in Delaware. Id. 
Furthermore, the mere threat of Indubitable Equivalent Prong mischief may be a valuable bargaining tool for 
distressed debtors. 
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practice and counsels against all-equity plans. This Article concludes that 
allowing creditors to invoke the Indubitable Equivalent Prong to cram down 
all-equity plans would be ill-advised. 
I. PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS AND THE INDUBITABLE EQUIVALENT PRONG 
A. Philadelphia Newspapers May Lead to Successful Cramdown of All-Equity 
Plans 
The Philadelphia Newspapers ruling on credit bidding12 has resulted in 
significant negative commentary,13 even though it may be an inconsequential 
issue.14 But the case carries potential implications far beyond credit bidding. 
The true threat of Philadelphia Newspapers comes from the implications of the 
reasoning employed by the majority, rather than its specific result. 
The ruling in Philadelphia Newspapers was premised on the court’s 
understanding that the three provisions of § 1129(b)(2)(A) are distinct from 
each other.15 Specifically, the court first held that the provisions of 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A) are not exclusive; the mere fact that a proposed sale could be 
undertaken under the Sale Prong did not preclude a sale from being undertaken 
under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong.16 Second, the court recognized that a 
secured creditor has the right to credit bid when a sale is conducted under the 
Sale Prong, but held that it did not follow that creditors have the right to credit 
 
 12 A process in which a secured creditor offers to “buy” the collateral, using the amount owed on his 
claim as payment. For a thorough explanation of the mechanics, see generally Buccola & Keller, supra note 9. 
 13 See, e.g., id. at 101. See generally Cohen, supra note 9. 
 14 As it turns out, aside from imposing considerable delay, the opinion had no practical impact in the case 
at bar: the secured creditors won the initial auction. See Maryclaire Dale, Publisher: Creditors Win Bid for 
Philly Newspapers, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2010-04-28-
philadelphia-newspaper-auction_N.htm. However, the auction had to be held again when the creditors 
subsequently failed to close on the purchase. Philadelphia Newspapers Auction-Bound Again, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/14/AR2010091406948.html. 
In the end, the creditors won the new auction as well. Steven Church, Philadelphia Inquirer Lenders Beat 
Perelman in Court Auction, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2010-09-24/philadelphia-inquirer-lenders-beat-perelman-in-court-auction.html. Despite the closing 
issues faced by the bidding creditors, at least one commentator has argued that the actual Philadelphia 
Newspapers holding is basically irrelevant because sophisticated creditor groups can simply write themselves a 
check if they so desire. See Pesce, supra note 9. Going forward, DIP lenders (who are normally the prepetition 
secured creditors) will insist on provisions in the DIP agreement that forbid proposal of a plan that seeks to 
strip credit bidding rights. See id. 
 15 See generally In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 311. 
 16 Id. at 309–10. 
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bid when a sale occurs under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong.17 In so holding, 
the court rejected the argument that the interplay between credit bidding rights 
and other sections of the Code evinced an intent to provide secured creditors 
maximum protection against losses due to undervaluation of the creditor’s 
collateral—either by judicial valuation or by the market.18 
Although Philadelphia Newspapers only directly dealt with the interaction 
between the Sale Prong and the Indubitable Equivalent Prong respecting credit 
bidding, nothing about the court’s reasoning limits its holding to the credit 
bidding issue. More broadly, Philadelphia Newspapers arguably stands for the 
proposition that a plan proposed under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong need 
not provide all of the rights and protections for creditors contained in the other 
provisions of § 1129(b)(2)(A). The important inquiry, then, focuses on how the 
reasoning that led to the Philadelphia Newspapers opinion may be applied to 
the Indubitable Equivalent Prong more broadly. This Article’s inquiry focuses 
on the interaction between the Indubitable Equivalent Prong and the lien 
retention requirement in the Retention Prong.19 
The Sale Prong mandates that a plan must (i) provide for the sale of the 
collateral; (ii) provide for the attachment of a lien to the proceeds of such sale; 
and (iii) preserve the right of creditors to credit bid.20 Similarly, the Retention 
Prong mandates that a plan must (i) provide for payments of the creditor’s 
principal and an appropriate rate of interest and (ii) provide for the retention of 
the creditor’s lien on the collateral.21 If the Philadelphia Newspapers court 
correctly held that a debtor can sell under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong 
instead of the Sale Prong,22 it is unclear why a debtor would be unable to 
 
 17 Id. at 309–12. 
 18 Id. at 315–16 (“The import of [§§ 363(k) and 1111(b)], according to the [creditors], is that Congress 
clearly intended that any sale of collateral—whether under § 363 or a plan of reorganization—would permit 
credit bidding by secured lenders. This argument fails in light of the plain language and operation of the 
Code.”). It should be noted that the ruling was not on plan confirmation—it was an approval of auction 
procedures. Id. at 301 (noting that the opinion was “affirm[ing] the District Court’s approval of proposed bid 
procedures.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, the court specifically stated that it was possible that the auction 
would not lead to realization of the indubitable equivalent of the creditor’s claims. See id. at 309–12. 
 19 Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) requires a plan to retain a creditor’s lien over the collateral when the debtor 
keeps the collateral under the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) 
provides that if the collateral is sold, the creditor’s lien attaches to the proceeds of the sale, and that the 
resultant lien must be treated in accordance with either (i) or (iii). See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). This Article is 
primarily concerned with situations where the plan contemplates the debtor’s retention of collateral. 
 20 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 21 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 22 Note that Judge Ambro—the only Court of Appeals judge who sits on the National Bankruptcy 
Conference—vigorously dissented on this point, arguing that all sales free of liens must be conducted under 
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retain the collateral in a plan under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong instead of 
the Retention Prong. And, if the right to credit bid under the Sale Prong need 
not be preserved under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong, then it is far from 
certain that the creditor’s right to maintain its lien under the Retention Prong 
need be preserved. 
B. A Brief Summary of the Motivations Behind Proposing All-Equity Plans 
Before determining whether a debtor has the ability to strip a secured 
creditor’s lien under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong, it is necessary to 
determine why a debtor would seek to do so.23 Among other possibilities, the 
debtor may have a desire to free up collateral so that the debtor can borrow 
additional funds; it may think decreasing leverage or immediate cash outflows 
will make the plan more likely to survive feasibility analysis or produce 
beneficial accounting results; or it may have inside information that leads it to 
conclude that stripping the creditor’s lien will allow for greater returns. These 
possibilities are explored in turn. 
1. The Need to Obtain Additional Capital 
A chapter 11 debtor coming out of reorganization will, like any other 
business, have working capital needs, as well as a desire to fund capital project 
outlays. Indeed, for a plan to be feasible (a mandatory requirement for 
confirmation),24 a debtor must demonstrate, among other things, that it has 
sufficient access to capital.25 To the extent the debtor can emerge from 
bankruptcy unencumbered by prepetition liens, it will have greater access to 
 
the Sale Prong and all retention plans must be conducted under the Retention Prong. In re Phila. Newspapers, 
599 F.3d at 325–27, 338 (Ambro, J., dissenting); List of National Bankruptcy Conference Members, NAT’L 
BANKR. CONF., http://www.nationalbankruptcyconference.org/members.cfm (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). 
 23 Fully examining these business questions is far beyond the scope of this Article. They are presented 
here solely to provide some context for the legal question. 
 24 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11); In re Smith, 333 B.R. 94, 98 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2005) (“[T]he 
Bankruptcy Code requires as a precondition to confirmation that a court determine that ‘[c]onfirmation of the 
plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the 
debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan.’ The purpose of this feasibility requirement ‘is to prevent 
confirmation of visionary schemes which promises creditors and equity security holders more under a 
proposed plan than the debtor can possibly attain after confirmation.’” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); In re Made in Detroit, Inc., 299 B.R. 170, 175 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (“Feasibility is a 
mandatory requirement for confirmation.”). For a list of factors considered in feasibility analysis, see generally 
Factors Considered in Determining Feasibility, in General, 5 Bankr. Serv. L. Ed. (West) § 45:246 (July 2011). 
 25 See, e.g., In re Made in Detroit, 299 B.R. at 176–77 (noting that plan was not feasible because of lack 
of assurances regarding exit financing). 
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secured credit going forward.26 This is most important for working capital 
purposes—the terms of a revolving credit facility will be much more favorable 
if it is backed by a first position lien. Additionally, if a debtor seeks to make a 
significant capital outlay (say, for example, to build a new plant), then having 
unencumbered assets in addition to the plant may allow the debtor to receive 
more money on more favorable terms. Of course, any new secured credit will 
further subordinate the formerly secured creditor. Furthermore, having more 
unencumbered assets on the books may make lenders more willing to lend on 
an unsecured basis. 
2. Capital Structure Concerns 
Courts consider whether a debtor’s proposed post-confirmation capital 
structure can be effectively serviced when determining whether a plan is 
feasible.27 If the debtor cannot demonstrate that it will be able to service loan 
payments under the prepetition capital structure, among other things, it may (i) 
attempt to strip the creditor’s lien and cram equity down on the creditor; (ii) 
cram down a significantly altered note that retains the creditor’s liens, but 
includes functions like payment in kind (“PIK”) toggles, negative amortization, 
balloon payments, and other methods of payment deferral; or (iii) strip the 
creditor’s lien and cram down an unsecured note with payment deferral 
provisions.28 Of these options, (i) raises fewer concerns with regard to 
feasibility, because it minimizes exposure to the increased interest rates that 
would result from the heightened riskiness of the loans proposed in (ii) and 
(iii).29 
 
 26 See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 641–42 (1997) 
(discussing, generally, the benefits and burdens associated with secured credit). 
 27 See In re Repurchase Corp., 332 B.R. 336, 342 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) (noting that, among other 
things, a firm’s capital structure is relevant to the feasibility analysis). 
 28 For a general discussion of the ways a debtor can force a new capital structure through the cramdown 
process, see generally Patrick Halligan, Cramdown Interest, Contract Damages, and Classical Economic 
Theory, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 131 (2003). 
 29 See Richard E. Mikels & Adrienne K. Walker, The Developing Impact of Till v. SCS on Chapter 11 
Reorganizations, in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING 2007, at 295, 298–301 (PLI Real Estate Law and 
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. N-536, 2007) (discussing determination of interest rates in cramdown and 
noting that a view endorsed by the Supreme Court is that interest rates determined in cramdown will be “not so 
high as to doom the plan” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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3. Potential Abuse of Inside Information or Collusion Between the Debtor 
and the Secured Creditor 
A debtor proposing a lien-stripping plan may have inside information that 
is motivating the proposal.30 A plan that proposes to strip a creditor’s lien and 
cram down equity potentially exposes the creditor to significant overvaluation 
risk: the plan may allow junior claimants to receive more value from a 
cramdown than they are entitled to. Accordingly, a debtor (which is often 
being run by junior stakeholders, such as management with equity interests) 
will have a strong incentive to take advantage of information that allows it to 
accurately predict whether a judge will overvalue collateral in a cramdown 
proceeding. 
It is arguable, however, that inside information does not pose a significant 
risk. As noted above, due to the operation of loan covenants, secured creditors 
are often in the driver’s seat even before the debtor files a chapter 11 petition. 
Secured creditors have significant incentives to actively monitor debtors.31 
Additionally, once the bankruptcy case is filed, the judge has considerable 
informational access, though the judge might remain at an informational 
disadvantage compared to the debtor’s management.32 Thus, while there are 
procedural safeguards that might prevent the filing or confirmation of a plan 
that aims to take advantage of inside information,33 those safeguards may be 
insufficient to protect against the risks posed by all-equity plans. Conversely, it 
is also possible that the debtor and secured creditors could be colluding in an 
effort to push out general unsecured creditors.34 These concerns about 
informational disadvantages contribute to the conclusion that all-equity plans 
should not be confirmed under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong. 
 
 30 See Edward S. Adams, Toward a New Conceptualization of the Absolute Priority Rule and its New 
Value Exception, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1445, 1484–85 (1993) (noting concern about inside information in the 
context of the New Value Exception). 
 31 See Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 
55–56 (1982) (arguing that secured loans encourage secured creditors to monitor borrowers). 
 32 See Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate Governance in 
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 134 (1998) (noting that “bankruptcy judges suffer an 
informational disadvantage vis-a-vis managers” that might impair the oversight role). 
 33 See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the 
Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1939–41 (2006). 
 34 Indeed, the fact that this had occurred in the railroad reorganizations of the 1800s was one of the 
primary inspirations behind the Absolute Priority Rule. See C.R. Bowles & John Egan, The Sale of the Century 
or a Fraud on Creditors?: The Fiduciary Duty of Trustees and Debtors in Possession Relating to the “Sale” of 
a Debtor's Assets in Bankruptcy, U. MEM. L. REV. 781, 832-33 (1998); Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, 
and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Auctions, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 80-84 (1991). 
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C. Theoretical Basis for Lien Stripping Under the Indubitable Equivalent 
Prong 
As a theoretical matter, as long as the creditor receives something that has 
the same present value as its allowed claim—which includes provision of an 
appropriate rate of interest to account for the risk of non-payment—the creditor 
has received the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim.35 If the creditor is paid 
in cash, then there is a high level of confidence that the present value of the 
payout has been accurately determined—cash, after all, has a known value.36 
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry. For any number of reasons, a 
debtor may elect not to pay the secured creditor’s claim in cash, and may 
instead propose to pay the secured creditor with debt or equity. In this situation 
it matters whether the creditor receives debt secured by its prepetition 
collateral. When the creditor receives debt secured by its prepetition collateral, 
the creditor may, depending on the circumstances, be unimpaired (i.e., viewed 
as not having been harmed by the plan, and, thus, unable to dissent).37 The 
more problematic situation occurs when a debtor proposes a plan to pay a 
prepetition secured creditor with (i) security interests in collateral other than 
the prepetition collateral (replacement lien cases) or (ii) entirely unsecured 
debt.38 In either case, the lien retention requirement of the Retention Prong will 
not be met. Accordingly, the inquiry must then shift to whether the Indubitable 
Equivalent Prong will be satisfied. 
Philadelphia Newspapers evinces a flexible approach to the Indubitable 
Equivalent Prong: as long as the secured creditor receives the value to which it 
is entitled, it has no complaint even if it surrenders rights that are meant to 
protect its entitlement to payment. Credit bidding, for example, is a mechanism 
meant to guard against undervaluation of collateral or other inefficiencies in 
the market. If the secured creditor believes that its collateral is being 
undervalued, it is able to put its money where its mouth is. Thus, credit bidding 
 
 35 See Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditor’s Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 
F.3d 229, 246–47 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 36 See id. at 247 (holding that a secured creditor received the indubitable equivalent of its claim when it 
was paid the full value of its claim in cash, notwithstanding the fact that it did not have the right to credit bid at 
the sale of its collateral). 
 37 An unimpaired creditor cannot object to confirmation of a plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (2006). 
However, merely paying a secured creditor at 100 cents on the dollar is not sufficient to render a creditor 
unimpaired if any of the secured creditor’s legal or equitable rights are hindered by the plan. Id. § 1124(1). The 
remainder of the Article assumes that the secured creditor in question is, in fact, impaired, and that any 
proposed plan must be confirmed over its objection. 
 38 See discussion infra Section III. 
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is simply a tool that allows the creditor to realize on its claim—a tool that the 
Philadelphia Newspapers court eliminated from the secured creditor’s options. 
More broadly, cramdown analysis has long acknowledged that a creditor is not 
entitled to retain all of its prepetition contractual rights: courts regularly 
confirm plans that do not preserve prepetition loan covenants,39 although some 
courts have refused to do so where removal of a particular covenant would 
expose a creditor to a significantly greater risk of underpayment.40 
Some limitations notwithstanding, the fact that courts will cancel loan 
covenants41 in a cramdown situation is significant. Modern secured creditors 
often exercise equity-like control through their lending covenants, particularly 
when a debtor is in distress.42 Altering those covenants effects a fundamental 
change in creditors’ prepetition rights. To wit, much of the debate surrounding 
reinstatement of prepetition loans43 focuses on loans that have both low interest 
rates and lax covenants.44 Indeed, as a theoretical matter, specific ex ante costs 
of credit can be tied to the presence of certain lending covenants.45 
Accordingly, the removal of covenants in the cramdown process, while 
perhaps less striking than canceling a creditor’s lien, is a serious affair. In the 
end, covenants and liens serve the same purpose: they regulate the risk a 
 
 39 See, e.g., In re Mesa Air Grp., No. 10-10018 (MG), 2011 WL 320466, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 
2011). In a related context, a court has held that the provision of adequate protection does not require 
adherence to prepetition covenant arrangements. See In re General Growth Props., Inc., 412 B.R. 122, 134–35 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). In General Growth, the court held that the creditors’ cash collateral was adequately 
protected, notwithstanding the fact that the debtor proposed to upend the prepetition covenants relating to cash 
flow and cash management amongst the various subsidiaries. Id. at 134–36. For general background on 
General Growth Properties Inc.’s prepetition cash flow systems, see Richard J. Corbi, How Remote is 
“Bankruptcy Remote” for Special Purpose Entities, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Nov. 2009, at 5. For 
examples of cases discussing permissible ways prepetition covenants can be altered or eliminated, see 7 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.04[2][a][v] nn.27 & 28 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 
2010). 
 40 For a thorough discussion of the cases on point, see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, 
¶ 1129.04[2][a][v]. 
 41 Loan covenants are essentially contractual conditions on a loan that, if breached, allow a creditor to 
exercise a variety of remedies. See generally Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung 
Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115, 135–40 (2009). 
 42 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 3, at 784–85. 
 43 Note that these types of loans occur under 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2). For an example of the high stakes 
involved with reinstatement, see JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Charter Commc’ns Operating, LLC (In re Charter 
Commc’ns), 419 B.R. 221, 230 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (addressing a situation in which a reinstatement 
resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in annual savings). See also Jeffrey W. Levitan, Ingredients for a 
Successful Cram Up Reorganization, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ 
PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202444588249&slreturn=1. 
 44 See Levitan, supra note 43. 
 45 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 1129.04[2][a][v]. 
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creditor assumes when making a loan. Covenants, therefore, are yet additional 
tools designed to assure full payment that are subject to alteration or removal 
in a cramdown. 
A similar story can be told about a secured creditor’s lien. Outside of 
bankruptcy, a lien enables a creditor to take possession of the collateral and 
sell it if the debtor defaults on its obligations.46 The creditor has no interest in 
becoming the owner of the collateral: the lien is simply a tool that allows the 
creditor to realize on its claim.47 However, even in the case of first-lien holders 
(sophisticated lenders who take security interests and have bargained for a 
right to first payment), the right to foreclose on and sell property is incidental 
to the creditor’s interest in being paid.48 
Indeed, security interests are not sacrosanct under the Code: notably, in the 
adequate protection context, the court can allow for priming liens (postpetition 
liens that have greater priority in given collateral than the prepetition lien in the 
same collateral) under certain narrow circumstances.49 Additionally, as 
discussed, courts have recognized a variety of contexts in which the terms of a 
secured creditor’s lien may be altered.50 Finally, although the legislative 
history is informative, the bare assertion that “[u]nsecured notes as to the 
secured claim or equity securities of the debtor would not be the indubitable 
equivalent”51 does not explain why that should be the case. 
But a view of a security interest as just another contractual tool does not 
square with the Code. Judge Ambro noted in his Phildelphia Newspapers 
 
 46 See U.C.C. § 9-610 (2001). 
 47 Given the prevalence of claims trading, it is not always accurate to say that creditors in today’s chapter 
11 world would rather receive payment than ownership of the collateral. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 
5, at 661. 
 48 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of 
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 97, 112 (1984); Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditors’ Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-
Concern Surplus in Corporate Bankruptcy, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 287, 300–01 (2003). The foregoing sources 
treat the adequate protection context—in other words, these sources address how secured creditors should be 
protected during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. Baird & Jackson, supra, at 97; Tene, supra, at 300–01. 
 49 For example, a priming lien may be granted if there is no other option available to secure postpetition 
financing. 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)(A) (2006). Note that a secured creditor whose lien is primed must receive 
adequate protection. Adequate protection, of course, is the other Code provision that invokes the “indubitable 
equivalent” language. Id. § 361(3). 
 50 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 51 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 546 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6544 (statement of Sen. 
Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, Subcomm. on Improvements in Judiciary Mach. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
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dissent that protection of secured creditors is prominent throughout the Code. 
The rights of secured creditors have been seen as property rights, deserving of 
higher protections than other types of contractual rights.52 Furthermore, the 
legislative history of the Code reflects a position that lien stripping is 
impermissible under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong, though it remains silent 
as to less-protected contractual obligations.53 
The inquiry, then, shifts to addressing how broadly the Indubitable 
Equivalent Prong should be read and whether the problem of valuation 
uncertainty should constrain the provision’s application. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF VALUATION UNCERTAINTY 
A. The Valuation Uncertainty Problem 
Many of the Code’s protections for secured creditors are based on an 
arguably justifiable fear about the vagaries of the judicial valuation process.54 
Indeed, the cost, delay, and uncertainty that accompany this process are 
motivating factors behind the growing utilization of sales under § 363 and 
prepackaged plans.55 However, in non-sale plans with objecting creditors, the 
judicial valuation process cannot be avoided. 
Put simply, the valuation uncertainty problem as it relates to cramdown 
situations represents the idea that an unbiased judge may not assign the correct 
value to the debtor’s assets in the cramdown process. If the actual value of the 
enterprise is 100, and symmetrical uncertainty of 20% exists, the judge could 
assign a value to the enterprise as low as 80 or as high as 120. Though judges 
recognize that they cannot be sure of the exact enterprise value, the Bankruptcy 
 
 52 See John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 978–82 (1989). 
 53 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 546 (“Unsecured notes as to the secured claim or equity securities of the 
debtor would not be the indubitable equivalent.”). 
 54 This Article does not attempt to fully model the issues surrounding valuation uncertainty. There is 
extensive literature that more thoroughly discusses the theoretical problems of valuation uncertainty. See, e.g., 
Baird & Bernstein, supra note 33, at 1935. Additionally, some attempt has been made to mathematically 
model valuation uncertainty. See generally Bo Huang, Absolute Priority Rule and the Options Theory 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). This Article discusses the problem only in the level of detail 
necessary to illustrate the problem’s interaction with the concept of lien stripping. 
 55 Paul Steven Singerman & Paul A. Avron, Bankruptcy Transformed: Are Reorganizations a Thing of 
the Past?, BUS. REORGANIZATION COMM. NEWSL. (Am. Bankr. Inst., Alexandria, Va.), Mar. 2010, at 173, 174, 
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/busreorg/vol9num4/past.pdf (noting continued trend toward 
§ 363 sales). 
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Code requires the judge to pick a single value for cramdown purposes.56 For 
the reasons discussed below, this uncertainty increases the risk that the secured 
creditor will not realize the full value of its claim if the debtor fails post-
confirmation. 
In a case where the judge knows the exact contours of his uncertainty, the 
judge can account for the variance by imposing a higher interest rate to account 
for the risk. Unfortunately, a far more common—and difficult—valuation 
uncertainty question arises when the judge has no way of knowing what he 
does not know: the judge is aware that there is uncertainty, but he does not 
know the exact parameters of that uncertainty. In such circumstances, there is 
no way to impose an interest rate that accurately accounts for the uncertainty. 
There are two fundamental reasons why the increased risk of nonpayment 
due to valuation uncertainty should be minimized. First, as a normative matter, 
the bankruptcy process should protect the non-bankruptcy rights of the 
parties.57 Outside of bankruptcy, a secured creditor has bargained for security 
to minimize its risk of nonpayment, and that position should be respected.58 
Second, if the Indubitable Equivalent Prong is interpreted in a way that 
increases a secured creditor’s risk of not realizing the value of its claim ex post, 
then creditors will impose a higher cost of credit ex ante to compensate for that 
risk, and that higher cost will be borne by all parties seeking secured credit.59 
The immediate response to this critique of all-equity plans is that secured 
creditors have upside potential from the imposition of valuation uncertainty.60 
If a secured claim on one hand and an equity share on the other both have an 
expected value of 100, then a risk-neutral creditor should be indifferent about 
which it receives. If a lien guarantees payment of 100, and a grant of equity, 
 
 56 See J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 282–84 (1991). 
 57 See generally Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ 
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982). Jackson’s is the seminal work on the issue. 
 58 See id. at 871. This is a normative claim based on the idea that the creditors’ bargain should be the 
driving force behind interpretation of the Code. See id. at 860. This vision of bankruptcy is not without its 
detractors. See Casey, supra note 4 (manuscript at 7) (citing Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an 
Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336 (1993)). This debate is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 59 This is a claim based on simple economic theory; unfortunately, little or no empirical work appears to 
have been done on the question of whether interpretation of a given bankruptcy provision has a noticeable 
impact on the credit markets. Certainly, if chapter 11 were abandoned in favor of a “fresh start” system for 
companies, no one would argue that the cost of credit would not generally go up, so it is not incredible to claim 
that credit markets are sensitive to the Code’s contours. Furthermore, secured credit is generally cheaper than 
unsecured credit. Therefore, the thought that higher cost of credit would be the result of a Code interpretation 
that allows for lien stripping logically follows. 
 60 See discussion infra Section II.A.1 and related payout tables. 
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due to valuation uncertainty, is worth either 0 or 200 with equal probability, 
then the creditor has no grounds for complaint because the expected payout is 
100—precisely what the creditor bargained for. 
It is true that a creditor whose claim is significantly61 less than the value of 
the enterprise62 stands to gain from valuation uncertainty when a judge assigns 
a total enterprise value that is too low.63 Under these circumstances, a debtor 
would not propose, in good faith, an all-equity plan unless it were in dire need 
of balance sheet improvement to meet the feasibility confirmation 
requirement.64 But a debtor whose secured creditors are significantly over-
secured would probably not be concerned about feasibility unless there were 
also significant unsecured claims to service.65 Of course, a judge should 
decline to confirm a plan where there exists a high risk that the secured 
creditor will receive a premium to the detriment of junior creditors.66 
Accordingly, it is difficult to see a situation in which a debtor, acting in good 
faith, would propose an all-equity plan where the secured creditor had a 
reasonable possibility of being overpaid. 
That is not to say a debtor would never propose such a plan. A secured 
creditor may collude with the debtor—more precisely, the debtor’s 
management—in an effort to push out intermediary creditors. If an over-
secured creditor, the debtor, or both, possess information suggesting that the 
judge will undervalue the enterprise, the secured creditor may offer out-of-the-
money management (who are often equity holders) a position with the post-
confirmation debtor, perhaps through promises of continuing employment or 
future equity participation. In exchange, the debtor management would agree 
to propose an all-equity plan in which the creditors are over-secured. Due to 
valuation uncertainty, the judge may not realize that the wool is being pulled 
 
 61 See discussion infra Section II.A.1 and related payout tables. The exact tipping point changes based on 
a number of variables. 
 62 Either because the creditor has a lien on all of the assets and is significantly over-secured, or because it 
has a lien on only some of the assets and the enterprise as a whole is worth significantly more than its claim, 
and the additional enterprise assets are not burdened by another creditor’s lien. 
 63 Or in the case of a creditor with a lien on only some of the debtor’s assets, if the judge assigns too high 
a value to the creditor’s collateral in relation to the enterprise as a whole. 
 64 It is more likely that if all of the parties were aware of the fact that the creditor was over-secured, the 
debtors would propose a rights offering to raise the additional capital. 
 65 This is because the fact that the existing secured creditors are over-secured (i.e., the collateral is worth 
more than the loan on the collateral) implies that the debtor has not tapped out its access to the credit markets 
because, at a minimum, it could obtain more secured credit. 
 66 This is known as the “100% limitation” and is considered to be another “uncodified” aspect of the fair 
and equitable rule. See Klee, supra note 7, at 231–32. 
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over his eyes, and the secured creditor will walk away with a larger portion of 
the equity than had it not colluded with the debtor. 
Therefore, the debtor will only be in the position to propose an all-equity 
plan if (i) its management has inside information that leads it to believe that the 
judge will overvalue the enterprise,67 or at least not undervalue it enough that 
the secured creditor stands to benefit;68 (ii) the debtor and secured creditors are 
acting in collusion; or (iii) it is not clear that the secured creditor is over-
secured (i.e., even ignoring the possibility of inside information, there exists a 
reasonable range of enterprise values), and the debtor’s management believes 
that it stands to gain more than it stands to lose. The key point is that the ball is 
in the debtor’s court,69 and that all-equity plans lend themselves to varieties of 
gamesmanship that lien retention plans do not. 
Furthermore, there is a systemic point to be made. All-equity plans create 
risks of under- or over-payment that simply are not present in lien retention 
plans. This is true even assuming that the all-equity plans were proposed in 
good faith, and that secured creditors in the aggregate would stand to win as 
often as they would stand to lose under an interpretation of the Indubitable 
Equivalent Prong that allowed for all-equity plans. In any individual case, the 
secured creditor would probably receive either too much or too little on a 
present value basis. This risk simply does not exist if the lien is maintained.70 
Both under- and over-payment are undesirable in any given case even if, in 
the aggregate, a reading of the Code that allowed for all-equity plans would 
benefit creditors and debtors at an approximately equal rate. Retention of the 
creditor’s lien is also risk-neutral, and does not create the same chance of 
under- or over-payment (and the resultant ex post violations of the Absolute 
Priority Rule). While the dogmatic justification for the Absolute Priority Rule 
is generally phrased in terms of ex ante efficiency—a desire to lower the cost 
of credit—if two solutions have the same ex ante benefits (lien retention plans 
on one hand and all-equity plans in a zero-sum world on the other), basing 
policy on the path that has better ex post effects is fully justified. A pound of 
feathers and a pound of lead may weigh the same, but the feathers make a far 
 
 67 Or undervalue a creditor’s collateral, if the creditor does not have a security interest in everything. 
 68 This does not even need to be “hard” inside information that has been concealed from the creditor and 
the judge. It could simply be a better sense of the business. 
 69 At least until the period of debtor exclusivity is over. 
 70 As previously acknowledged, the current system does destroy the option value of junior creditors, but 
that is an argument against basing our system on present value analysis. If present value analysis is accepted, a 
secured creditor who retains its lien can never be paid more than what it is entitled to. 
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nicer pillow. Ex ante efficiency is not the only reason to desire “fair” payment 
waterfalls. 
Accordingly, the Indubitable Equivalent Prong should generally not be read 
to allow all-equity plans if there is any risk of valuation uncertainty because, as 
demonstrated below, lien retention best minimizes the impact of that risk on all 
parties. Therefore, because bankruptcy judges generally cannot know the 
precise amount of valuation uncertainty present,71 the Code should be 
interpreted to have a very strong presumption against all-equity plans. 
1. Valuation Uncertainty and Creditors with a Lien over All the Debtor’s 
Assets 
When a creditor has a security interest in all of the debtor’s assets, the 
value that the bankruptcy judge assigns to the enterprise and the value assigned 
to the creditor’s collateral are the same.72 The result is that any enterprise value 
at or below the face value of such a creditor’s claim should result in the 
creditor owning the entire business.73 If the enterprise is worth more than the 
creditor’s claim,74 junior creditors receive a payout. 
When the creditor retains its lien over all of the debtor’s assets, she is 
protected against valuation uncertainty if the debtor is liquidated 
postconfirmation. Specifically, if the judge assigned too low a value to the 
enterprise, on a subsequent liquidation at a higher value the secured creditor 
will be paid in full. If the judge assigned too high a value to the enterprise, at a 
subsequent liquidation for a value below the judicial valuation, the creditor 
will be paid all the available funds. 
On the other hand, if the creditor does not retain its lien and is instead given 
equity under the plan, it is exposed to dilution risk if the assigned enterprise 
 
 71 In other words, the judge—outside of the “lottery ticket” hypothetical context—is working with a 
range of plausible valuation. But (i) while the judge may be able to assign rough probabilities of any given 
outcome in that range, the judge is dealing with probabilities, not certainties; and (ii) there remains the 
possibility that, ex ante, the true value may fall outside what seems—at the time of confirmation—to be the 
plausible range of values. 
 72 This fact eliminates the relevance of § 1111 for creditors with a security interest in all of the debtor’s 
assets. 
 73 Subject to variation by operation of the New Value Exception, as discussed in Section IV, infra. 
 74 Including post-petition interest, to which over-secured creditors are entitled during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2006). 
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value is too high.75 Regardless of whether v(min) and v(max) will be assigned 
with equal probability, or whether v(min) and v(max) will not be assigned with 
equal probability (that is, when the valuation variance is asymmetrical), the 
expected value of the equity received will only be higher than the expected 
recovery from retention of a lien when the creditor is sufficiently over-
secured.76 In either case, the amount of oversecurity necessary is a function of 
the amount of variance in the valuation—the greater the possible variance, the 
more over-secured the creditor must be in order to have upside potential.77 This 
is because, in all cases, the creditor’s upside is capped by the fact that it can 
never receive more than 100% of the equity regardless of the value of her 
claim and v(min). On the other hand, the downside risk from increasing 
v(max) amounts is uncapped. Accordingly, because the set of circumstances 
that allow a creditor to receive as much or more under an all-equity plan as 
they would receive under a lien retention plan is narrow in scope and 
noticeable to the debtor, such plans are unlikely to be proposed. Therefore, 
when debtors propose all-equity plans, they disproportionately lead to lower 
recoveries for secured creditors.78 Such plans should not be confirmed where 
valuation uncertainty is reasonably implicated.79 
 
 75 Please see the Appendix for payout tables illustrating these general principles. For an attempt to 
provide a proof model of valuation uncertainty that is not subject to the following simplifying assumptions, see 
Huang, supra note 54. Mr. Huang’s work on modeling the effect of valuation uncertainty in all-equity plans 
significantly influenced this Article’s efforts. Several important simplifying assumptions drive the payout 
tables in the Appendix. First, I adopt a lottery ticket model, such that v(max) and v(min) represent the only 
possible values, and each has an equal chance of occurring. Second, the assumption that v is the combination 
of all future possibilities is embraced by also assuming that subsequent liquidation realizes precisely v. Third, 
interest costs, court costs imposed by the bankruptcy process itself, and so on are ignored. Of course, firms 
generally have holdings other than lottery tickets, and so v’ may not be symmetrical, with v(max) and v(min) 
having unequal probability: for example, if v(real) = 60, v(min) = 51.43 with 70% probability and v(max) = 80 
with 30% probability. Further, v(max) and v(min) are not likely to be the only possible values: it is more likely 
that assigned value will be between v(max) and v(min); and any one of these values may be more or less likely 
to be applied than any other possible value. The same qualifiers apply to the amount realized at liquidation: 
there is a limitless range of possibilities that lead to v = 60 at confirmation. Furthermore, if v(real) = 60, post-
confirmation, the debtor could be liquidated for either v = 30 or 90 (or 40/80; 20/100; 10/110; 0/120) at equal 
probability, and the actual payout would deviate from what was predicted based on v = 60; and, to add one 
final complicating factor, the possibilities related to liquidation payout could also be asymmetrical. A full 
modeling of all of these possibilities is simply impractical here. I leave it to another author to propose a model 
that can capture all of the possibilities in a useful way. 
 76 In order for the secured creditor to actually do better under an all-equity plan, the judge must 
undervalue the enterprise in cramdown. Furthermore, any payout in an all-equity plan is ultimately subject to 
uncertainty. See Huang, supra note 54, at 29. 
 77 Where the variance is asymmetrical, a sufficiently low risk of undervaluation will minimize the 
amount of over-security needed to have upside potential. 
 78 This Article does not make an effort to provide a model for the not-uncommon situation where a 
creditor has a lien on only a part of the debtor’s assets. Similar valuation uncertainty problems exist and are 
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III.  INDUBITABLE EQUIVALENCE BEFORE PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS: 
REPLACEMENT LIEN AND “DIRT FOR DEBT” PLANS 
As previously noted, it is entirely unclear what “indubitable equivalent” 
means in the context of the cramdown provisions. The “indubitable equivalent” 
language itself has its genesis in an adequate protection ruling by Judge Hand: 
[A] creditor who fears the safety of his principal will scarcely be 
content with that; he wishes to get his money or at least the property. 
We see no reason to suppose that the statute was intended to deprive 
him of that in the interest of junior holders, unless by a substitute of 
the most indubitable equivalence.80 
Philadelphia Newspapers and In re Pacific Lumber Co. were not the first 
cases in which the Indubitable Equivalent Prong was invoked. But courts have 
always narrowly construed the provision,81 and the provision has historically 
been invoked only in narrow circumstances: abandonment, purported “dirt for 
debt” plans (which are rarely confirmed), and replacement lien plans. In each 
circumstance, courts have acknowledged the role that valuation uncertainty 
plays in their analysis. Therefore, past practice under the Indubitable 
Equivalent Prong is consistent with the idea that the provision should not be 
read to allow for cramdown of all-equity plans.82 
 
compounded by the fact that the judge must engage in separate valuation exercises—for both the creditor’s 
collateral and the enterprise as a whole. In general, under such plans, v(max-collateral) allows a creditor to 
receive a greater proportion of the equity payout. However, there is one caveat: if v(max-collateral) exceeds 
the creditor’s claim (most likely to occur for over-secured creditors, but possible for any creditor depending on 
the degree of valuation variance), equity value is shifted to the other party. Therefore, the absolute best case 
for the creditor in all cases is v(max-collateral) and v(min-other) where v(max-collateral) equals to the value of 
the creditor’s claim. This state of the world most closely resembles that of a debtor with a single over-secured 
creditor and, if v(max-collateral) equals the value of the creditor’s claim, the creditor would actually be 
overcompensated. The worst case for the creditor is v(min-collateral) and v(max-other), which dilutes the 
creditor in a similar fashion to an undersecured creditor where the enterprise is overvalued. An over-secured 
creditor stands to see a better payout under v(min-collateral) and v(min-other) than v(max-collateral) and 
v(max-other) because the creditor’s benefit from v(max-collateral) is capped to the value of its claim while its 
exposure to v(max-other) is not capped. Many of these calculations are subject to possible modification by the 
operation of § 1111(b)—if the election could be taken in all-equity plans. The relationship between 
v(collateral) and v(other) can become even more complex where v(collateral) and v(other) are co-dependent. 
 79 For an example of a situation where valuation uncertainty is probably not implicated, see discussion 
infra Section IV.B. 
 80 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 
1935); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 1129.04[2][c]. 
 81 For example, one court noted simply that “‘[i]ndubitable’ means ‘too evident to be doubted.’ We 
profess doubt on the facts of this case.” Arnold & Baker Farms v. United States (In re Arnold & Baker Farms), 
85 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (declining to confirm a “dirt for debt” plan). 
 82 Indeed, one commentator has proposed that even under the traditional paradigm, valuation uncertainty 
counsels that the Indubitable Equivalent Prong be used only where the debtor can demonstrate with near-
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A. The Indubitable Equivalent Prong’s Clearest Use Is Where Collateral Is 
Abandoned 
The Indubitable Equivalent Prong is most clearly and easily applied in 
cases of abandonment. Where the debtor abandons the secured creditor’s 
collateral, the Indubitable Equivalent Prong is satisfied.83 This is not surprising 
because abandonment replicates a secured creditor’s non-bankruptcy right to 
foreclose on and sell its collateral. Courts have applied a tautology to explain 
this rule: “Since the value of [the secured creditor’s] secured claim is equal to 
the value of [its collateral], a plan which provides that [the secured creditor] 
will realize the indubitable equivalent of [its collateral] will satisfy the 
requirements of [the Indubitable Equivalent Prong].”84 Where a plan provides 
for abandonment, “common sense tells us that property is the indubitable 
equivalent of itself,” and the plan satisfies the Indubitable Equivalent Prong.85 
Viewed from the perspective of valuation uncertainty, this result makes 
eminent sense in the case of a creditor with a lien on all of the debtor’s assets. 
Allowing such a creditor to exercise its non-bankruptcy rights completely 
removes judicial valuation uncertainty from the equation. As discussed in the 
context of valuation uncertainty generally, if the creditor is undersecured, it 
receives the entire value of the company, which is all that it is entitled to. 
Accordingly, there is no better way for a court to dampen the possible effect of 
valuation uncertainty. 
On the other hand, in instances where creditors hold liens on only some of 
a debtor’s assets, the valuation uncertainty issue may still create some concern. 
 
certainty that the creditor will get “at least as much” as she would have received under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) or 
(ii). See Neil Wyland, Towards Protection of Creditors and Estimated Claims in Cram Down: How 
Indubitable Should the Equivalence Be?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1389, 1423 (1995). However, that interpretation is 
not convincing because it essentially reads the provision out of the Code: if the Indubitable Equivalent Prong 
can only be utilized where the debtor can demonstrate that the creditor will get “at least as much” as he would 
have received under the other provisions, a debtor would never invoke the provision, even in the “traditional” 
abandonment plans, because abandoning the collateral to the creditor imposes all of the transactions costs of 
sale—costs that would otherwise be borne by the debtor—on the creditor. Furthermore, it is itself subject to 
significant judicial discretion and uncertainty—can “near certainty” slip to “more likely than not” and then 
“likely”? An approach that focuses on certain kinds of plans (in this case, all-equity plans) is both more precise 
and more in line with the Code. 
 83 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 1129.04[2][c] (citing 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 (1978) 
(statement of Rep. Don Edwards) (“Abandonment of the collateral to the creditor would clearly satisfy 
indubitable equivalence.”)); id. (citing 124 CONG. REC. 34,007 (1978) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini)). 
 84 Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. La. Nat’l Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th 
Cir. 1989). 
 85 Id. 
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As In re Sandy Ridge itself notes, the “such claim” language in the Indubitable 
Equivalent Prong refers to secured claims.86 If a secured creditor does not take 
the § 1111(b) election,87 the judge may still have to value its collateral for the 
purposes of determining the creditor’s statutory deficiency claim.88 In order to 
eliminate judicial valuation uncertainty, the plan would need to be structured in 
a way that allows the creditor to sell the collateral after it takes possession of it 
and before final enactment of the plan. But if an immediate sale is 
contemplated, the sale should be conducted pursuant to the various procedures 
afforded to sales under a plan, and “abandonment” would be a misnomer. Even 
in this case, the secured creditor has no room for complaint: having been given 
the right to exercise its non-bankruptcy rights to foreclose upon the collateral, 
if an immediate sale is not possible, it is no worse off than it would have been 
outside of bankruptcy. 
B. Asset Payment Plans Are Viewed with Skepticism, and Courts Explicitly 
Cite Valuation Uncertainty as the Primary Concern 
“Dirt for debt” or “asset payment” plans are, in essence, partial 
abandonment plans. Instead of allowing a secured creditor to foreclose on all 
of its collateral, the plan proposes to satisfy the secured creditor’s entire claim 
by surrendering enough of the collateral to pay the secured creditor in full.89 
These plans are entirely reliant on judicial valuation, and they expose 
creditors to a variety of risks.90 First, there is the basic valuation risk at the 
time the valuation occurs: the secured creditor may not be over-secured—or 
not as over-secured as the debtor claims. Second, if the debtor is proposing an 
 
 86 See id. at 1349. 
 87 It is entirely unclear whether a secured creditor should be able to take the § 1111(b) election in 
abandonment plans. See 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2006). Section 1111(b) is generally understood to protect 
secured creditors against low-ball sales of their collateral. That concern is not present in abandonment plans. 
As a theoretical matter, it may be appropriate to look at abandonment plans as a “sale” where the secured 
creditor is deemed to have bid the judicially assessed value of the collateral. The creditor would remain 
entitled to a deficiency claim for the difference between the judicially set value of its collateral and the face 
value of its claim, which is the state of the world where the § 1111(b) election is not taken. 
 88 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (stating that a claim is secured only “to the extent of the value of such 
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . and [the remainder] is an unsecured claim”). 
 89 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 1129.04[2][c], at 1129–28. Such plans are only possible 
where the secured creditor is over-secured. By way of illustration: the face value of the secured creditor’s 
claim is 80, and the collateral is worth 100. Instead of selling 80% of the collateral for 80 and turning the 
proceeds over to the secured creditor, or allowing the creditor to retain its lien on all of the property, the debtor 
proposes to abandon 80% of the collateral. 
 90 See Wyland, supra note 82, at 1394–95. 
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asset payment plan in good faith91 instead of simply selling the collateral in 
question to pay the secured creditor, the collateral must be illiquid at the time 
of confirmation; otherwise, the debtor is proposing to enter an impermissible 
forced “sale”-leaseback transaction as part of the plan. In either case, the risk 
of decreases in the transferred collateral’s value has been shifted to the secured 
creditor—and the creditor has lost the cushion formerly provided by the full 
lien on the original collateral. Because asset transfer plans typically do not 
provide for the retention of any lien, there is no way to impose a higher interest 
rate to account for the increased risk. 
Some courts have allowed asset transfer plans where the assets transferred 
provide a cushion to account for the uncertainty.92 This amounts to an “in 
kind” step-up, and the approach suffers from the same shortcomings as the 
Step-Up doctrine itself: there remains no way to know whether the additional 
“cushion” has either (i) adequately compensated the secured creditor, or (ii) 
overcompensated the secured creditor at the expense of junior interests.93 
Furthermore, unlike complete abandonment plans, asset payment plans do not 
provide a secured creditor with the same rights she would have had outside of 
bankruptcy because the creditor is not entitled to foreclose on and sell all of 
the collateral. Accordingly, the valuation uncertainty problem counsels against 
confirmation of asset payment plans for the same reason it counsels against 
confirmation of all-equity plans more generally. 
C. Replacement Lien Cases Are Dominated by Whether the New Collateral 
Has a Similar Risk Profile 
In a lien replacement plan,94 the debtor attempts to strip the secured 
creditor of its lien over the originally bargained-for collateral and replace it 
 
 91 As noted previously, a debtor may use the judicial valuation process in an effort to extract value from 
judicial overvaluation. If a judge knows with certainty that a debtor has proposed a plan with the intent to 
underpay creditors through manipulation of the valuation process, the judge should hold that the plan has not 
been filed in good faith. Such a plan cannot be confirmed regardless of any other considerations. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(3) (mandating that a plan of reorganization may only be confirmed if filed in good faith). 
 92 For a general discussion of such cases, see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, 
¶ 1129.04[2][c]. 
 93 See discussion infra Section IV. 
 94 Such plans can obviously be proposed only when the secured creditor does not have a lien on all of the 
assets. Because this Article does not attempt to fully model these situations, the complete dynamics of lien 
replacement plans will not be considered here. However, it should be noted that the valuation problems with 
lien replacement plans apply with even greater force when, instead of receiving a new lien, the creditor is 
forced to accept all equity. 
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with a lien over different collateral.95 Such plans may only be confirmed if the 
new lien adequately protects the creditor’s principal and provides for a market 
rate of interest.96 Importantly, if the creditor is over-secured, the new lien need 
not provide the same level of oversecurity;97 while some reduction in 
oversecurity is permissible, it is unclear how much reduction would render a 
plan unconfirmable. 
There are a variety of reasons why a debtor would propose such a plan. It 
may be because the secured creditor has a lien on the debtor’s most saleable 
assets, and the creditor wants to replace that lien with a lien on less liquid 
assets. Illiquid assets are the ones that are likely to be most bound up in the 
success or failure of the firm. Imagine a manufacturing company that holds 
both illiquid capital assets (e.g., a plant and unique parts that only it uses in its 
manufacturing process) as well as liquid inventory (e.g., completed goods, raw 
resources that could be resold to other companies) and liquid investment assets 
(e.g., stocks, cash). Outside of bankruptcy, unless a company is seeking to 
permanently reduce its output, it will turn first to its saleable assets to provide 
working capital before cannibalizing its illiquid capital assets. If the creditor 
has a lien on the liquid non-capital assets, it may be able to prevent such a sale 
in order to assure it is paid before the enterprise fails. On the other hand, 
because the value of illiquid assets—such as a plant—is more thoroughly 
entangled with the going-concern value of an enterprise, if the creditor’s lien is 
shifted to such assets, when the enterprise fails, the value available to the 
secured creditor will be lower. 
More insidiously, the debtor probably has more information about the 
proposed new collateral than any other party. Because the new collateral was 
previously unencumbered, it has probably been subject to less scrutiny as to 
value than encumbered assets. Accordingly, the debtor may think that the 
judge will overvalue the new collateral. On subsequent liquidation, when the 
judge’s error is realized, the secured creditor will be underpaid. 
In either case discussed above, a creditor in a lien replacement plan faces 
valuation uncertainty risk both as it relates to its original collateral and as it 
 
 95 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 1129.04[2][c]. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Wyland, supra note 82, at 1410 (“Usually, however, the substitute collateral is worth considerably less 
than the original collateral.”). 
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relates to the new collateral.98 This increased exposure to valuation uncertainty 
has made courts hesitant to confirm lien replacement plans.99 
1. A Special Set of Replacement Lien Cases: Cases in Which Some of the 
Prepetition Collateral Is Removed from the Lien and No Replacement 
Collateral Is Provided 
In one recent Southern District of New York case, a bankruptcy court 
confirmed a plan under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong that simply removed 
some of a prepetition secured creditor’s collateral from the post-confirmation 
lien.100 Additionally, the terms of the lien itself were made more onerous: a 
PIK toggle function was added, and the maturity date was significantly 
extended.101 
The court made clear that its ruling was largely based on the fact that the 
secured creditor was highly over-secured.102 As discussed above, where a 
creditor is highly over-secured, he does not face significant downside potential 
from losing his lien. Accordingly, although the court did not address the 
valuation uncertainty problem, because there was essentially zero risk that the 
secured creditor would go unpaid, valuation uncertainty was a non-factor. It is 
entirely unclear just how over-secured is “over-secured enough” for this line of 
argument to prevail. 
The In re DBSD decision is troubling, in that, even though the decision did 
not address valuation uncertainty directly, it represents a line of reasoning that 
 
 98 See supra Section II.A.1 and related payout tables for a brief introduction on the valuation uncertainty 
issues that arise where there are multiple points of valuation. 
 99 For a listing and discussion of cases, see 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 1129.04[2][c]. 
 100 In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 419 B.R. 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d in part on other grounds, 
Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am. Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am. Inc.), 634 F.2d 79, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(affirming the decision of the lower court with regards to the Indubitable Equivalent Prong). It should be noted 
that the treatment of the Indubitable Equivalent Prong proved to be dicta because the bankruptcy court 
properly designated the secured creditor’s vote. Id. at 204 (noting that the secured creditor’s vote was 
designated, but going on to discuss cramdown as an additional ground for affirmance); see Network Corp., 634 
F.3d at 104–06 (finding that the secured creditor’s vote was properly designated and ignored for class voting 
purposes and accordingly declining to reach the Indubitable Equivalent Prong argument). However, the 
Indubitable Equivalent Prong language in In re DBSD has been recognized as being potentially more important 
in the long run than the vote designation issue. See, e.g., Ben Feder, The Dog that Didn’t Bark—Second 
Circuit’s Opinion in DBSD North America Disallows Gifting, But Is Silent on Cramdown of Secured Creditor, 
BANKR. L. INSIGHTS (Mar. 2, 2011, 10:18 AM), http://www.bankruptcylawinsights.com/articles/chapter-11/. 
 101 In re DBSD, 419 B.R. at 189–95 (discussing the proposed changes to the capital structure in the 
context of determining feasibility of the plan). 
 102 Id. at 208–09. 
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allows a judge to exercise discretion regarding the impact his own valuation 
uncertainty will have. It is entirely unclear just how over-secured is “over-
secured enough” for the DBSD line of argument to prevail—in other words, 
how certain must the judge be that there is no risk of non-payment before the 
judge can invoke DBSD? DBSD itself was a clear case, and it turns out the 
cram-down aspect of the decision was dicta.103 It remains to be seen whether 
future debtors will push the Indubitable Equivalent Prong reasoning in DBSD, 
but this Article illustrates that the courts should apply DBSD’s reasoning only 
in the clearest of cases. 
IV.  VALUATION UNCERTAINTY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STEP-UP DOCTRINE 
AND THE NEW VALUE EXCEPTION 
As previously noted, technical compliance with one of the provisions of 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) is necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, to satisfy 
the fair and equitable rule. There are several uncodified aspects of the fair and 
equitable rule that may operate to block confirmation of a plan that meets the 
technical requirements of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii).104 This Section 
demonstrates that: (i) the Step-Up doctrine should be viewed as an attempt at 
addressing valuation uncertainty but that the doctrine should not allow for all-
equity plans because it inadequately addresses the problem; and (ii) the New 
Value Exception should not be combined with an all-equity plan because 
valuation uncertainty would result in secured creditors being systematically 
exposed to increased underpayment risk. 
A. The Step-up Doctrine Should Not Be Employed as a Way of Condoning 
Lien-Stripping Plans 
The Step-Up doctrine provides that if a creditor is going to be forced to 
accept “inferior” (i.e., lower in priority) securities under a plan, then the 
creditor must be given a bonus payment above the face value of its claim.105 
 
 103 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 104 See generally Klee, supra note 7. 
 105 Id. at 232–33. The doctrine is said to have its genesis in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois. 
312 U.S. 510, 528–29 (1941) (“[W]hile creditors may be given inferior grades of securities, their ‘superior 
rights’ must be recognized. Clearly, those prior rights are not recognized, in cases where stockholders are 
participating in the plan, if creditors are given only a face amount of inferior securities equal to the face 
amount of their claims. They must receive, in addition, compensation for the senior rights which [sic] they are 
to surrender. If they receive less than that full compensatory treatment, some of their property rights will be 
appropriated for the benefit of the stockholders without compensation. That is not permissible.”); see also 7 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 1129.03[4][b]. 
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While it is not entirely clear that the doctrine survived enactment of the 
Code,106 the legislative history does support its continued vitality.107 Although 
the doctrine has been applied in all-equity plan circumstances, it has not been 
invoked in any published plan confirmation since the enactment of the Code.108 
Nonetheless, the potential utilization of the doctrine in connection with a 
proposed all-equity plan under the Indubitable Equivalent Prong merits 
consideration. 
On initial examination, the Step-Up doctrine seems to be at odds with the 
prohibition against paying a senior creditor more than the full value of its 
claim.109 If a secured creditor is owed 100, and is given securities with a “real” 
present value of 110, it has received 10 more than what it is entitled to receive. 
This is an unjustifiable result. To the extent that the creditor is exposed to 
greater nonpayment risk due to the loss of its lien, if it received a debt security 
or preferred stock, the appropriate way to account for the risk is through 
imposition of a higher interest rate. If it receives equity, the equity’s value is a 
summation of all future possibilities—including nonpayment risk—and the 
creditor has still been overcompensated. 
In order to address this possible problem, commentators and courts have 
suggested that the bonus payment is essentially a payment in redemption for 
the loss of priority.110 In other words, the argument is that the “priority right” 
itself has an independent value, subject to valuation by the judge, and that 
 
 106 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 1129.03[4][c]. 
 107 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 377 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6370 (“The partial codification 
of the absolute priority rule here is not intended to deprive senior creditor [sic] of compensation for being 
required to take securities in the reorganized debtor that are of any equal priority with the securities offered to 
a junior class. Under current law, seniors are entitled to compensation for their loss of priority, and the 
increased risk put upon them by being required to give up their priority will be reflected in a lower value of the 
securities given to them than the value of comparable securities given to junior [sic] that have not lost a 
priority position.”). 
 108 In fact, the doctrine does not appear to have been invoked under any circumstance in recent years. 
Notably, in In re Calpine, a senior unsecured creditor opposed confirmation of a subordinated creditor’s plan 
of confirmation, invoking the Step-Up doctrine to argue that the consideration being received was insufficient. 
See Objection of Certain 6% Convertible Noteholders to Confirmation of Debtors’ Fourth Amended Joint Plan 
of Reorganization at 39, In re Calpine Corp., No. 05-60200 (BRL), 2007 WL 4661093 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 
2007). The Calpine court approved the plan notwithstanding the step-up argument; it appears that the waterfall 
payment schedule—which was tied to a later judicial valuation—resulted in zero payment to the subordinated 
creditor, which rendered the senior unsecured creditor’s step-up argument moot. See Order Confirming Sixth 
Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, In re Calpine Corp, No. 05-60200 (BRL), 2007 WL 456522, at *16 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2007). Accordingly, it is unclear whether Calpine can be seen as giving any sense 
of the doctrine’s continuing vitality. 
 109 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 1129.03[4][b][i][A]; Klee, supra note 7, at 232–34. 
 110 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 1129.03[4][b][i][A]; Klee, supra note 7, at 234. 
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payment of the bonus amount is in consideration of the loss of the right to 
priority. But that explanation is nonsense. It assumes that a priority right has 
value independent of the underlying right to payment. If that were the case, one 
would expect that outside of bankruptcy, a secured creditor owed 100 would be 
willing to cancel its lien in exchange for an unsecured note with a face value of 
10 and an increased interest rate on both the original (now unsecured) loan and 
the new compensatory loan, and that a debtor would be willing to engage in 
such an exchange. However, under what circumstance would a debtor who is 
able to service payments—at a lower rate of interest—on a claim of 100 be 
willing to incur an additional 10 of debt in order to secure release of a lien? 
Furthermore, that explanation itself injects valuation uncertainty into the 
equation: if a bankruptcy judge faces a difficult task in valuing collateral, he 
faces an even more difficult task in valuing a right to payment priority.111 
The same question can be asked where the secured creditor receives all 
equity instead of an unsecured note under a plan: under what market conditions 
would a secured creditor conceivably be willing to exchange its 100 secured 
claim for a 110 equity interest? Presumably, only where sufficient information 
is available that would allow the creditor to conclude that the equity interest is 
actually worth 110. 
Therefore, instead of viewing the Step-Up doctrine as a method for directly 
compensating a secured creditor for its loss of priority, the doctrine should be 
viewed as an attempt to address the valuation uncertainty problem. Providing a 
bonus payment is a way of accounting for the fact that the “unknown 
unknowns” prevent a judge from setting an interest rate that adequately 
accounts for increased risk. 
Unfortunately, the Step-Up doctrine fails to adequately solve the valuation 
uncertainty problem.112 The step-up reduces, but does not eliminate, the 
 
 111 One commentator has attempted to provide a model to address the fact that judges pick the amount of 
the bonus payment as a “theoretical construct” not necessarily connected to market value. Thomas H. Jackson, 
Note, Giving Substance to the Bonus Rule in Corporate Reorganizations: The Investment Value Doctrine 
Analogy, 84 YALE L.J. 932, 936–37 (1975). But the model’s focus on determining reasoned step-up amounts 
does not address the fact that, as demonstrated below, there is no way to implement a step-up without creating 
either under- or over-payment risk. 
 112 An illustration is in order. A secured creditor is owed 100, v(real) = 120; v(min) = 80; v(max) = 160. 
In an all-equity plan, the creditor should receive 83% of the equity. Without a step-up, the creditor receives 
100% of the equity, worth 120, at v(min), or 62.5%, worth 75, at v(max), for an expected payout of 97.5. With 
a 10% step-up in the equity received, the creditor’s expected payout is 103.5. This is unsurprising because the 
step-up mimics a greater amount of over-security and, as demonstrated earlier, where a creditor is sufficiently 
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secured creditor’s overvaluation risk, unless the step-up meets or exceeds the 
possible overvaluation variance amount. Of course, there is no way to know 
that precise amount. Additionally, even if the judge could precisely account for 
overvaluation variance, such a large step-up significantly increases the risk of 
overpaying the secured creditor, to the detriment of junior creditors. 
Accordingly, the Step-Up doctrine is an inferior solution for valuation 
uncertainty, when compared to maintenance of the lien. 
B. A Brief Excursion into the New Value Exception 
Simply stated, the New Value Exception allows a junior creditor (often, but 
not always, an equity holder) to obtain an interest in the reorganized company 
by contributing sufficient money or money’s worth.113 Like the Step-Up 
doctrine, the New Value Exception is a carryover from pre-Code practice; but 
unlike the Step-Up doctrine, the New Value Exception has been extensively 
employed in post-Code practice.114 
The New Value Exception does not appear to have been utilized 
simultaneously with an all-equity plan proposal. However, after Philadelphia 
Newspapers a debtor may attempt to simultaneously strip a creditor’s lien and 
invoke the New Value Exception. Courts should not confirm such plans 
because of valuation uncertainty concerns. The senior creditor’s downside risk 
is due to undervaluation of the enterprise, which poses dilution risk for the 
senior creditor in the new value context.115 As with all-equity plans generally, 
there is a possibility that the senior creditor would be overpaid: if the judge 
assigns too high a value to the enterprise initially, the junior creditor’s new 
 
over-secured, she may be overpaid in all-equity plans. If the same facts are assumed, but the creditor is owed 
120, the creditor’s expected payout with a 10% step-up is only 111. 
 113 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 39, ¶ 1129.03[4][c]. See generally, Charles W. Adams, New 
Capital for Bankruptcy Reorganizations: It’s the Amount that Counts, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 411 (1995); S.W. 
O’Donnell, Toward a Better Understanding of New Value, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 703 (2004); Tene, supra note 
48, at 328–31. 
 114 The issue of whether the exception has vitality is a contested one. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra 
note 39, ¶ 1129.03[4][c], at 1129–94 (detailing circuit split). The Supreme Court has not decided the circuit 
split on the issue. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Savs. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 449 
(1999). 
 115 Assume that, before the contribution of new value, v(real) = 60; v(min) = 40; and v(max) = 80. After 
the junior creditor contributes 20 of new money, v(real) = 80; v(min) = 60; and v(max) = 100. In an all-equity 
plan, the junior creditor’s “20” of equity is set: at v(min) the junior and senior both receive 50%; at v(max) the 
junior receives 20% and the senior receives 80%. The senior’s expected payout is 65 even if his original claim 
was 100, 120, etc. Of course, the real relationship between the new money and the possible valuations are 
more complex. The junior creditor will probably argue that his contribution of 20 now means the enterprise 
will see significantly higher returns in the future, such that both v(max) and v(min) would be higher. 
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contribution would be diluted.116 But it is unlikely such circumstances would 
occur because the junior creditor unilaterally decides to attempt to contribute 
new value. Therefore, the combination of new value with an all-equity plan 
poses even greater risks than all-equity plans generally, and such plans should 
not be confirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Indubitable Equivalent Prong has historically been invoked only in a 
narrow set of circumstances. Successful invocation of the provision has been 
rarer still. As this Article has demonstrated, concerns about the effect of 
valuation uncertainty have driven this narrow application of the provision. If 
debtors (and colluding creditors) invoke the reasoning from Philadelphia 
Newspapers to propose all-equity plans in the future, courts would be wise to 
remember that they cannot know precisely what they do not know. Such plans 
create opportunities for gamesmanship that do not exist in lien retention plans, 
and even where there is no gamesmanship involved, such plans unjustifiably 
exacerbate the valuation uncertainty problem. Ex ante and ex post effects that 
result from increasing the risk of under- or over-compensating senior creditors 
outweigh the potential benefit of additional flexibility for debtors. Therefore, 




 116 For example, if, before new value is added, v(real) = 100, v(min) = 80, v(max) = 120. After 20 new 
value is added, v(real) = 120, v(min) = 100, v(max) = 140. If the judge assigns v = 140, the debtor putting in 
new value will receive only 20/140 = 14.28% of the equity, even though the debtor should have received 
20/120 = 16.67%. If the company is subsequently liquidated for v(real) (120) the debtor loses 2.97 due to the 
overvaluation. 
SEXTON GALLEYSFINAL2 12/13/2011 9:33 AM 
84 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28 
APPENDIX 
For the following payout tables,117 v(real) = “actual” value; v(max) = 
maximum overvaluation value; v(min) = minimum undervaluation value; 
Prob(v(min)) = the probability that the judge will assign an enterprise value of 
v(min); Prob(v(max)) = the probability that the judge will assign an enterprise 
value of v(max). Bolded is the equilibrium point, where the expected value of 
equity is equal to both (i) the claim; and (ii) the expected payout where the 
creditor retains her lien. 
Throughout the calculations, v is kept constant at 60. Therefore, 60 = 
(Prob(v(min)) × v(min)) + (Prob(v(max)) × v(max)). 
A. Payout Tables for a Single Secured Creditor with a Lien on All of the 
Debtor’s Assets 
1. Payouts Where v’ Is Symmetrical 
Where v(min) and v(max) are symmetrical, Prob(v(max)) and Prob(v(min)) 
are both 50%. Accordingly, there is only one variable: the symmetrical 
deviation from v. The calculated expected payouts are based on the prepetition 
claim amount; the claim amounts for each v’ value vary slightly where 
necessary to show helpful information. 
 
Payouts where v = 60, v(min) = 50, and v(max) = 70 
Amount of claim; 
payout if lien retained 
(% of claim realized) 
% of equity at 
v(max); payout if 
equity received 
% of equity at 
v(min); payout if 
equity received 
Expected value 
of equity (% of 
claim realized) 
10; 10 (100%) 14.29%; 8.57 20%; 12 10.29 (102.86%) 
20; 20 (100%) 28.57%; 17.14 40%; 24 20.57 (102.86%) 
30; 30 (100%) 42.86%; 25.71 60%; 36 30.86 (102.86%) 
35; 35 (100%) 50%; 30 70%; 42 36 (102.86%) 
40; 40 (100%) 57.14%; 34.29 80%; 48 41.14 (102.86%) 
45; 45 (100%) 64.29%; 38.57 90%; 54 46.29 (102.86%) 
50; 50 (100%) 71.43%; 42.86 100%; 60 51.43 (102.86%) 
52.5; 52.5 (100%)118 75%; 45 100%; 60 52.5 (100%) 
55; 55 (100%) 78%%; 47.14 100%; 60 53.57 (97.40) 
60; 60 (100%) 85.71%; 51.43 100%; 60 55.71 (92.86%) 
65; 60 (92.31%) 92.86%; 55.71 100%; 60 57.85 (89%) 
70; 60 (85.71%) 100%; 60 100%; 60 60 (85.71%) 
 
 117 For general discussion and conclusions based on these tables as well as simplifying assumptions, see 
supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 118 Equilibrium point: 14.29% over-secured. 
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Payouts where v = 60, v(min) = 40, and v(max) = 80 
Amount of lien; 
payout if lien 
retained (% of claim 
realized) 
% of equity at v+; 
payout if equity 
received 
% of equity at v−; 
payout if equity 
received 
Expected value 
of equity (% of 
claim realized) 
10; 10 (100%) 12.5%; 7.5 25%; 15 11.25 (112.5%) 
20; 20 (100%) 25%; 15 50%; 30 22.5 (112.5%) 
30; 30 (100%) 37.5%; 22.5 75%; 45 33.75 (112.5%) 
35; 35 (100%) 43.75%; 26.25 87.5%; 52.5 39.375 (112.5%) 
40; 40 (100%) 50%; 30 100%; 60 45 (112.5%) 
45; 45 (100%) 56.25%; 33.75 100%; 60 46.875 (104.2%) 
48; 48 (100%)119 60%; 36 100%; 60 48 (100%) 
50; 50 (100%) 62.5%; 37.5 100%; 60 48.75 (97.5%) 
55; 55 (100%) 68.75%; 41.25 100%; 60 50.63 (92.05%) 
60; 60 (100%) 75%; 45 100%; 60 52.5 (87.5%) 
70; 60 (85.71%) 87.5%; 52.5 100%; 60 56.5 (80.36%) 
80; 60 (75%) 100%; 60 100%; 60 60 (75%) 
90; 60 (66.67%) 100%; 60 100%; 60 60 (66.67%) 
 
Payouts where v = 60, v(max) = 90, and v(min) 30 
Amount of claim; 
payout if lien 
retained (% of claim 
realized) 
% of equity at 
v(max); payout if 
equity received 
% of equity at 
v(min); payout if 
equity received 
Expected value 
of equity (% of 
claim realized) 
10; 10 (100%) 11.11%; 6.67 33.33%; 20 13.33 (133.33%) 
20; 20 (100%) 22.22%; 13.33 66.66%; 40 26.66 (133.33%) 
30; 30 (100%) 33.33%; 20 100%; 60 40 (133.33%) 
35; 35 (100%) 38.89%; 23.34 100%; 60 41.67 (119.04%) 
40; 40 (100%) 44.45%; 26.67 100%; 60 43.33 (108.33%) 
45; 45 (100%)120 50%; 30 100%; 60 45 (100%) 
50; 50 (100%) 55.56%; 33.33 100%; 60 46.67 (93.33%) 
55; 55 (100%) 61.11%; 36.67 100%; 60 48.33 (87.88%) 
60; 60 (100%) 66.67%; 40 100%; 60 50 (83.33%) 
70; 60 (85.71%) 77.78%; 46.67 100%; 60 53.33 (76.19%) 
80; 60 (75%) 88.89%; 53.33 100%; 60 56.67 (70.83%) 




 119 Equilibrium point: 25% over-secured. 
 120 Equilibrium point: 33% over-secured. 
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Payouts where v = 60, v(max) = 100, and v(min) 20 
Amount of claim; 
payout if lien retained 
(% of claim realized) 
% of equity at 
v(max); payout if 
equity received 
% of equity at 
v(min); payout if 
equity received 
Expected value 
of equity (% of 
claim realized) 
10; 10 (100%) 10%; 6 50%; 30 18 (180% 
20; 20 (100%) 20%; 12 100%; 60 36 (180%) 
30; 30 (100%) 30%; 18 100%; 60 39 (130%) 
35; 35 (100%) 35%; 21 100%; 60 40.5 (115.71%) 
40; 40 (100%) 40%; 24 100%; 60 42 (105%) 
42.855;42.855 
(100%)121 
42.86%; 25.71 100%; 60 42.85 
(100.004%) 
45; 45 (100%) 45%; 27 100%; 60 43.5 (96.67%) 
50; 50 (100%) 50%; 30 100%; 60 45 (90%) 
55; 55 (100%) 55%; 33 100%; 60 46.5 (84.55%) 
60; 60 (100%) 60%; 36 100%; 60 48 (80%) 
70; 60 (85.71%) 70%; 42 100%; 60 51 (72.86%) 
80; 60 (75%) 80%; 48 100%; 60 54 (67.5%) 
90; 60 (66.67%) 90%; 54 100%; 60 57 (63.33%) 
2. Payouts Where v’ Is Not Symmetrical 
Where v(max) and v(min) are not symmetrical, there are two related 
variables (in other words, the solution of one variable depends on the value 
assigned to the other variable): (i) what is the difference between v(min) and 
v(max) (i.e., is v(min) = v − 10, v(max) = v + 20; or is v(min) = v − 20, v(max) 
= v + 10; with any number of variations?); (ii) what is the likelihood of v(min) 
compared to v(max) (i.e., is v(min) a 30% chance and v(max) a 70% chance, 
or vice-versa?). However, because Prob(v(min)) + Prob(v(max)) must equal 1, 
if either v(max) or v(min) are known, Prob(v(min)) and Prob(v(max)) must 
both be known. Therefore, it is only possible to generate a payout table 
(without a more sophisticated model) where only v(min) or v(max) are 
“alterable” variables. 
For example, in order to calculate v(min); v(max), Prob(v(max)), and 
Prob(v(min)) must be known. For example, where v(max) = 80, Prob(v(max)) 
= 30%, and Prob(v(min)) = 70%, our equation is 60 = .7(v(min)) + .3(80), and 
v(min) = 51.43. 
With those limitations in mind, the following payout tables are presented as 
illustrative examples with an acknowledgement that, without a more 
sophisticated model, it is impossible to capture even a representative sample of 
 
 121 Equilibrium point: 40% over-secured. 
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possibilities for v = 60. This, of course, is striking, because most firms are not 
lottery tickets, and situations where v(min) and v(max) are asymmetrical are 
bound to be more common than situations where they are symmetrical. 
 
 
v(real) = 60; v(max) = 80; Prob(v(max)) = 70%; v(min) = 13.33; Prob(v(min)) = 30% 
























10 100% 10 13% 75% 8 75% 450% 45 188% 19 
20 100% 20 25% 75% 15 100% 300% 60 143% 229 
30 100% 30 38% 75% 23 100% 200% 60 113% 34 
35 100% 35 44% 75% 26 100% 171% 60 104% 36 
38123 100% 38 47% 75% 28 100% 158% 60 100% 38 
40 100% 40 50% 75% 30 100% 150% 60 98% 39 
45 100% 45 56% 75% 34 100% 133% 60 93% 42 
50 100% 50 63% 75% 38 100% 120% 60 89% 44 
55 100% 55 69% 75% 41 100% 109% 60 85% 47 
60 100% 60 75% 75% 45 100% 100% 60 83% 50 
70 86% 60 88% 75% 53 100% 86% 60 78% 55 
80 75% 60 100% 75% 60 100% 75% 60 75% 60 




 122 Equilibrium point: 10.72% over-secured. 
 123 Equilibrium point: 58.31% over-secured. 
v(real) = 60; v(max) = 80; Prob(v(max)) = 30%; v(min) = 51.43; Prob(v(min)) = 70% 
























10 100% 10 13% 75% 8 19% 117% 12 104% 10 
20 100% 20 25% 75% 15 39% 117% 23 104% 21 
30 100% 30 38% 75% 23 59% 117% 35 104% 31 
35 100% 35 44% 75% 26 68% 117% 41 104% 36 
40 100% 40 50% 75% 30 78% 117% 47 104% 42 
45 100% 45 56% 75% 34 88% 117% 53 104% 47 
50 100% 50 63% 75% 38 97% 117% 58 104% 52 
52 100% 52 65% 75% 39 100% 115 60 103% 54 
54 100% 54 67% 75% 40 100% 112% 60 101% 54 
54 100% 54 68% 75% 41 100% 111% 60 100% 54 
54122 100% 54 68% 75% 41 100% 111% 60 100% 54 
55 100% 55 69% 75% 41 100% 109% 60 99% 54 
60 100% 60 75% 75% 45 100% 100% 60 93% 56 
70 86% 60 88% 75% 53 100% 86% 60 83% 58 
80 75% 60 100% 75% 60 100% 75% 60 75% 60 
90 67% 60 100% 67% 60 100% 67% 60 67% 60 
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v(real) = 60; v(max) = 70; Prob(v(max)) = 40%; v(min) = 53.333; Prob(v(min)) = 60% 
Lien Retained v(max) & Equity Received v(min) & Equity Received Expected  























10 100% 10 14% 86% 9 19% 113% 11 102% 10 
20 100% 20 29% 86% 17 38% 113% 23 102% 20 
30 100% 30 43% 86% 26 56% 113% 34 102% 31 
35 100% 35 50% 86% 30 66% 113% 39 102% 36 
40 100% 40 57% 86% 34 75% 113% 45 102% 41 
45 100% 45 64% 86% 39 84% 113% 51 102% 46 
50 100% 50 71% 86% 43 94% 113% 56 102% 51 
52 100% 52 74% 86% 45 98% 113% 59 102% 53 
54 100% 54 77% 86% 46 100% 111% 60 101% 55 
55124 100% 55 78% 86% 47 100% 110% 60 100% 55 
55 100% 55 79% 86% 47 100% 109% 60 100% 55 
60 100% 60 86% 86% 51 100% 100% 60 94% 57 
70 86% 60 100% 86% 60 100% 86% 60 86% 60 
80 75% 60 100% 75% 60 100% 75% 60 75% 60 
90 67% 60 100% 67% 60 100% 67% 60 67% 60 
 
 
 124 Equilibrium point: 9.52% over-secured. 
